The traffic through the world's maritime chokepoints usually tells a story before the headlines do.
This is the first edition of Chokepoint Watch, our monthly read of vessel traffic through the straits and canals that global trade depends on. It covers the 30 days to 27 September 2026, the latest period for which the IMF's PortWatch has published data.
Two things stand out, and a third needs confirming.
1. Hormuz: from about 90 a day to about 3
Through 2025 and the opening weeks of 2026, PortWatch recorded between roughly 55 and 103 vessels a day passing through the Strait of Hormuz, depending on the month. In mid-February the weekly average was above 90.
Then it stopped. The daily count fell from 57 on 28 February to 20 on 1 March and to 4 on 2 March. Since then, the weekly average has been between 1 and 6 transits a day in 24 of the 30 weeks to 27 September. The highest single day since 2 March was 51, on 24 June.
View data table
| Period | Strait of Hormuz |
|---|---|
| Week of 29 Dec 2025 | 58.6 |
| Week of 5 Jan 2026 | 64.4 |
| Week of 12 Jan 2026 | 53.3 |
| Week of 19 Jan 2026 | 56.3 |
| Week of 26 Jan 2026 | 60.0 |
| Week of 2 Feb 2026 | 60.7 |
| Week of 9 Feb 2026 | 76.4 |
| Week of 16 Feb 2026 | 94.3 |
| Week of 23 Feb 2026 | 77.6 |
| Week of 2 Mar 2026 | 2.6 |
| Week of 9 Mar 2026 | 2.1 |
| Week of 16 Mar 2026 | 1.4 |
| Week of 23 Mar 2026 | 3.6 |
| Week of 30 Mar 2026 | 5.3 |
| Week of 6 Apr 2026 | 5.9 |
| Week of 13 Apr 2026 | 7.4 |
| Week of 20 Apr 2026 | 4.0 |
| Week of 27 Apr 2026 | 12.3 |
| Week of 4 May 2026 | 1.4 |
| Week of 11 May 2026 | 5.4 |
| Week of 18 May 2026 | 4.9 |
| Week of 25 May 2026 | 3.0 |
| Week of 1 Jun 2026 | 4.4 |
| Week of 8 Jun 2026 | 2.4 |
| Week of 15 Jun 2026 | 12.1 |
| Week of 22 Jun 2026 | 30.4 |
| Week of 29 Jun 2026 | 23.1 |
| Week of 6 Jul 2026 | 14.0 |
| Week of 13 Jul 2026 | 6.3 |
| Week of 20 Jul 2026 | 3.6 |
| Week of 27 Jul 2026 | 5.3 |
| Week of 3 Aug 2026 | 5.6 |
| Week of 10 Aug 2026 | 4.4 |
| Week of 17 Aug 2026 | 5.0 |
| Week of 24 Aug 2026 | 4.3 |
| Week of 31 Aug 2026 | 3.1 |
| Week of 7 Sep 2026 | 5.3 |
| Week of 14 Sep 2026 | 3.1 |
| Week of 21 Sep 2026 | 3.1 |
There was one brief recovery. The weekly average rose to 30 a day in the week of 22 June and 23 in the week of 29 June, before falling back through July. The speed of that rebound and of the reversal is itself a signal: traffic here can move from one state to the other within days.
The collapse coincides with the start of the conflict with Iran on 28 February 2026, after which Iranian forces declared the strait closed to shipping and commercial vessels came under attack (USNI News, Lloyd's List Intelligence).
A caution on the level
PortWatch counts vessels from AIS signals, the transponder data that ships broadcast. Industry reports describe widespread AIS switch-offs and spoofing around the strait, and some analyses estimate that AIS may under-report actual traffic by as much as half (TradLinx).
Other counts are higher. Lloyd's List Intelligence's Strait of Hormuz Transit Monitor, which counts non-Iranian-linked cargo-carrying vessels over 10,000 deadweight tonnes, recorded 117 transits in the week of 14 to 20 September, about 17 a day. PortWatch recorded 22 in the same week, 3.1 a day. The two counts use different definitions, so they are not directly comparable, but the gap is large.
Both counts point the same way: traffic through the strait is a fraction of what it was before the conflict. What is in dispute is the level. Anyone using a single number for Hormuz traffic should know which method produced it.
2. The Red Sea baseline has not come back
Before the Red Sea crisis, the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait each handled about 74 vessels a day on average in 2023. Over the last 30 days, Suez averaged 40.7, 45% below its 2023 average. Bab el-Mandeb averaged 26.0, 65% below.
The traffic that left did not disappear. It moved around the Cape of Good Hope, which averaged 86.6 transits a day over the same period, 76% above its 2023 average.
View data table
| Period | Cape of Good Hope | Suez Canal | Bab el-Mandeb |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan 2023 | 42.3 | 71.0 | 71.6 |
| Feb 2023 | 42.0 | 70.1 | 70.5 |
| Mar 2023 | 43.2 | 71.8 | 73.4 |
| Apr 2023 | 45.1 | 77.3 | 74.8 |
| May 2023 | 49.2 | 77.4 | 77.6 |
| Jun 2023 | 51.6 | 75.3 | 76.5 |
| Jul 2023 | 52.3 | 71.3 | 74.1 |
| Aug 2023 | 56.5 | 71.5 | 73.0 |
| Sep 2023 | 55.8 | 74.2 | 75.4 |
| Oct 2023 | 50.4 | 76.2 | 78.7 |
| Nov 2023 | 49.3 | 76.6 | 77.3 |
| Dec 2023 | 51.4 | 71.4 | 65.2 |
| Jan 2024 | 72.2 | 48.0 | 39.4 |
| Feb 2024 | 85.8 | 42.4 | 34.9 |
| Mar 2024 | 85.9 | 38.9 | 32.6 |
| Apr 2024 | 87.7 | 40.9 | 32.4 |
| May 2024 | 91.6 | 40.7 | 32.0 |
| Jun 2024 | 95.5 | 39.0 | 31.4 |
| Jul 2024 | 91.7 | 38.5 | 28.9 |
| Aug 2024 | 93.7 | 40.3 | 31.3 |
| Sep 2024 | 86.5 | 37.4 | 30.6 |
| Oct 2024 | 89.0 | 37.5 | 31.6 |
| Nov 2024 | 83.7 | 36.0 | 33.2 |
| Dec 2024 | 81.0 | 35.7 | 32.0 |
| Jan 2025 | 84.4 | 37.1 | 32.2 |
| Feb 2025 | 87.9 | 34.1 | 32.0 |
| Mar 2025 | 80.7 | 37.3 | 32.9 |
| Apr 2025 | 84.1 | 37.0 | 32.8 |
| May 2025 | 89.4 | 37.0 | 33.1 |
| Jun 2025 | 91.9 | 36.7 | 31.7 |
| Jul 2025 | 96.4 | 38.0 | 31.2 |
| Aug 2025 | 98.1 | 38.6 | 35.0 |
| Sep 2025 | 94.4 | 42.1 | 33.9 |
| Oct 2025 | 94.1 | 41.3 | 36.1 |
| Nov 2025 | 87.2 | 42.9 | 37.8 |
| Dec 2025 | 84.7 | 40.1 | 32.7 |
| Jan 2026 | 87.7 | 39.1 | 33.5 |
| Feb 2026 | 87.0 | 41.4 | 36.8 |
| Mar 2026 | 91.3 | 41.0 | 35.5 |
| Apr 2026 | 92.8 | 42.1 | 36.7 |
| May 2026 | 96.9 | 39.1 | 36.1 |
| Jun 2026 | 92.8 | 40.4 | 36.6 |
| Jul 2026 | 91.5 | 41.9 | 33.6 |
| Aug 2026 | 90.3 | 41.0 | 27.4 |
| Sep 2026 (to 27th) | 86.6 | 40.7 | 26.2 |
Suez has been remarkably flat. Its monthly average has stayed between 34 and 43 transits a day in every month since January 2025. The Cape has stayed above 80 a day in every month since February 2024.
The one change worth noting is at Bab el-Mandeb. After a year and a half between 31 and 38 transits a day, the monthly average slipped to 27.4 in August, the lowest full-month reading in the PortWatch series, which begins in 2019. September, to the 27th, is lower again at 26.2.
Lloyd's List Intelligence's own weekly counts point the same way at Bab el-Mandeb, with a four-week average of 280 transits against 316 in June, although they show Suez up on June where PortWatch shows it flat. Lloyd's reports that ships that had avoided the Red Sea for years are increasingly being tracked sailing through it, while a Houthi blockade affecting Saudi oil exports and a shortage of escort warships are described as dampening prospects for traffic growth (Lloyd's List Intelligence).
Counts differ between providers because of differences in vessel types, size thresholds and detection methods, which is why we use one source consistently and read trends rather than levels. PortWatch also revised its chokepoint series in July and August 2026, adding tracked vessels and stronger checks for AIS spoofing and incomplete transits. We cannot tell from its published notes whether those revisions changed the earlier history as well, so the August and September readings are best treated as a signal to confirm over the coming weeks.
3. Two signals to verify: the Bosporus and Kerch
The Bosporus Strait links the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara and, through the Dardanelles, to the Mediterranean. It is the route out of the Black Sea for much of the region's seaborne trade. Over the last 30 days PortWatch recorded 52.4 transits a day there, 43% below the same period of 2025.
The decline has built over three months. The monthly average was 72.1 in July, 62.1 in August and 52.4 for September to date, against 91.8, 92.1 and 94.1 in the same months of 2025. August is the lowest full-month reading in the series since 2019.
View data table
| Period | Bosporus Strait |
|---|---|
| Jan 2023 | 92.7 |
| Feb 2023 | 91.8 |
| Mar 2023 | 106.4 |
| Apr 2023 | 104.5 |
| May 2023 | 104.8 |
| Jun 2023 | 102.6 |
| Jul 2023 | 95.4 |
| Aug 2023 | 91.2 |
| Sep 2023 | 90.5 |
| Oct 2023 | 93.3 |
| Nov 2023 | 88.4 |
| Dec 2023 | 98.1 |
| Jan 2024 | 91.9 |
| Feb 2024 | 98.8 |
| Mar 2024 | 105.9 |
| Apr 2024 | 106.7 |
| May 2024 | 99.2 |
| Jun 2024 | 100.1 |
| Jul 2024 | 95.5 |
| Aug 2024 | 98.5 |
| Sep 2024 | 92.3 |
| Oct 2024 | 98.9 |
| Nov 2024 | 96.4 |
| Dec 2024 | 88.9 |
| Jan 2025 | 92.5 |
| Feb 2025 | 83.7 |
| Mar 2025 | 89.6 |
| Apr 2025 | 93.3 |
| May 2025 | 93.8 |
| Jun 2025 | 91.4 |
| Jul 2025 | 91.8 |
| Aug 2025 | 92.1 |
| Sep 2025 | 94.1 |
| Oct 2025 | 98.4 |
| Nov 2025 | 101.0 |
| Dec 2025 | 86.5 |
| Jan 2026 | 81.7 |
| Feb 2026 | 78.7 |
| Mar 2026 | 90.7 |
| Apr 2026 | 92.0 |
| May 2026 | 87.8 |
| Jun 2026 | 81.7 |
| Jul 2026 | 72.1 |
| Aug 2026 | 62.1 |
| Sep 2026 (to 27th) | 52.4 |
We treat this as a signal to verify, not as a finding, for two reasons.
First, official Turkish figures for the first half of 2026 show traffic through the Istanbul Strait essentially unchanged on the year: 19,277 vessels, against 19,381 in the first half of 2025 (Daily Sabah). We have not found official figures confirming a fall since July.
Second, PortWatch revised its chokepoint series in July and August 2026, and it has documented a gap in the AIS data covering the Bosporus before, in 2024. We cannot tell from the data how much of the recent movement reflects ships and how much reflects measurement.
A fall of this size on a strait this important deserves attention, and we will keep tracking it.
The Kerch Strait, the link between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, averaged almost nothing over the last 30 days (0.03 a day, against 19.6 a year earlier). This series is lumpy and has been close to zero before, in the autumn of 2024 for instance, and the same measurement caveats apply, so we read it as something to watch rather than a conclusion.
The full picture
Here is every chokepoint in this edition, sorted by the change against the same 30 days of last year.
| Chokepoint | Last 30 days | Same 30 days, 2025 | Change | 2023 average | Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kerch Strait | 0.0 | 19.6 | -100% | 8.2 | -100% |
| Strait of Hormuz | 3.7 | 87.2 | -96% | 92.3 | -96% |
| Bosporus Strait | 52.4 | 92.7 | -43% | 96.7 | -46% |
| Bab el-Mandeb Strait | 26.0 | 35.0 | -26% | 74.0 | -65% |
| Oresund Strait | 38.7 | 47.8 | -19% | 45.3 | -15% |
| Malacca Strait | 219.0 | 243.6 | -10% | 220.1 | -1% |
| Panama Canal | 28.4 | 31.5 | -10% | 30.2 | -6% |
| Cape of Good Hope | 86.6 | 93.0 | -7% | 49.1 | +76% |
| Dover Strait | 164.3 | 174.6 | -6% | 174.7 | -6% |
| Gibraltar Strait | 133.0 | 137.3 | -3% | 146.4 | -9% |
| Suez Canal | 40.7 | 41.9 | -3% | 73.7 | -45% |
| Taiwan Strait | 236.4 | 243.3 | -3% | 239.9 | -1% |
Average daily transits of tracked cargo and tanker vessels. Last 30 days: 29 August to 27 September 2026. Red = fall of 25% or more; green = rise of 25% or more.
The pattern is concentrated rather than general. The large arteries of Asia–Europe and trans-Pacific trade, including the Malacca Strait, the Taiwan Strait, Gibraltar and Dover, are all within about 10% of last year. The movement is in a small number of places, and in each of them it is large.
What we think the data is telling us
Three things, in order of confidence.
First, and with the most confidence, rerouting has become the structural state of the market, not a temporary adjustment. The Cape of Good Hope has carried more traffic than the Suez Canal in every month since January 2024, and nothing in the September data suggests that is about to change.
Second, Hormuz is a different kind of event from the Red Sea, and the least ambiguous in the data. The Red Sea disruption moved traffic onto a longer route. In Hormuz, the evidence is of traffic being suppressed, with no equivalent alternative path for the cargo that normally passes through it. That has different consequences for energy flows, freight and insurance, and it is the one to watch most closely.
Third, the numbers are inputs to risk assessment and not a substitute for it. A transit count is a leading indicator of delay, cost and exposure, but it measures vessels and not cargo, and it depends on how those vessels are detected. The Bosporus and Kerch movements in particular need confirming. The sensible use is to compare trends over time and across sources.
What we are watching next month
Whether the weekly count at Hormuz breaks out of its 1 to 6 range. Whether the Bab el-Mandeb low in August and September is a blip or a new level. And whether the Bosporus decline is confirmed by other sources or fades as PortWatch's revisions settle.
You can test what these disruptions mean for a specific route in the Monaco Trade Forum Route Disruption Simulator, which uses the same PortWatch data.
Data and method
Source: International Monetary Fund, PortWatch (portwatch.imf.org), Daily Chokepoint Transit Calls. PortWatch estimates are based on satellite-captured AIS signals and classify vessels as dry bulk, general cargo, container, tanker and ro-ro; the counts shown are for all of these together. Data was retrieved on 6 October 2026 and covers the period to 27 September 2026. PortWatch updates weekly and may revise earlier figures, so numbers retrieved later can differ. The underlying data is available free of charge from the IMF.
Monaco Trade Forum calculated the averages and percentage changes shown here from those daily counts: the 30-day window is 29 August to 27 September in each year; monthly figures are averages of daily counts, with September 2026 covering 1 to 27 September; weekly figures run Monday to Sunday. These calculations and the charts are ours. The IMF is not responsible for them and has not endorsed this analysis.
PortWatch methodology notes referred to: a refinement of the Hormuz boundary in March 2026; revisions to chokepoint series in July and August 2026 (additional AIS sampling, added vessels, stronger checks for AIS spoofing and incomplete transits); and a documented gap in AIS coverage at the Bosporus between March and July 2024, since backfilled.
Other sources referred to: USNI News, Lloyd's List Intelligence, TradLinx and Daily Sabah. We cite their reporting and have not independently verified it.
This article is for information only and is not investment, legal, insurance or compliance advice.